Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER) was neglected by politi¬cians for much of the twentieth century as international security issues took priority. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and as economic issues have come to prominence TER has assumed increasing importance and yet is largely overlooked in academic discussion. This report places TER in its historical context and demonstrates how the political agenda and institutional setup are both largely dysfunctional. Viewed through the prism of industrial relations and drawing on some real life examples from both sides of the Atlantic, it argues that the social dimension is a challenge central to the future development of the relationship and proposes institutional innovations which could also be replicated in other areas: for instance in support of environmental concerns. Presenting some guiding principles for transatlantic trade, this paper recommends the creation of a new secretariat to act as a permanent contact point and providing a variety of practical functions essential to making TER work.
Comprising roughly 800 million people, the US and the EU accounted for 56.2 per cent of world GDP, 32.2 per cent of global trade in goods and 43.7 per cent of trade of services in 2007 (excluding intra EU 27 trade). 3 Another important economic factor is consumption. Although consumption is likely to grow faster in the emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere, the combined consumer demand of the EU and the US will remain crucial for the world economy in the foreseeable future as many emerging economies pursue their development with strategies based on strong exports into the North American and European markets. It is this overall imbalance that US President Barack Obama sought to address during the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh encouraging greater consumption and lower trade surpluses in the exporting nations of the world, led by China (but including the likes of Germany), while simultaneously promoting more saving and reduced deficits in the United States.
The broad economic indicators presented here show the importance of the transatlantic marketplace. A research report written for the US Congress summarized its external effects with the conclusion that the 'combined weight of these two economic superpowers means that how the US and EU manage their relationship and the difficult issues involving domestic regulations, competition policy, and foreign investment could well help determine how the rest of the world deals with similar issues'. 4 In other words, within a weak framework of global governance institutions, with World Trade Organization (WTO)
The Context of Transatlantic Economic Relations 1
While transatlantic relations have formed an important part of academic study, Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER) are often overlooked. Indeed, the attention on respective responses to the 'Global War on Terror' has diverted attention from other policy fields in which the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have common concerns and interests. Transatlantic economic cooperation is one of them.
The US and the EU started a formal process in the early 1990s culminating in the 'Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration' (FATEI) in April 2007. But this phenomenon has passed by largely unnoticed. By way of a background and introduction to the main theme of this paper, which addresses the lack of and need for a robust social dimension in TER, this section seeks to place the transatlantic economic relationship in its economic, historical and political context.
Although the political dynamics of TER are closely linked to the general political climate, the core economics of the partnership are not. As Andrews et. al. have argued, there is no evidence that political frictions in the fields of security and foreign policy have had any significant impact on the volume of transatlantic trade and investment. 2 Perhaps this economic stability is due to the characteristics and sheer size of the transatlantic marketplace. After all, the transatlantic economic partnership is the biggest and possibly the most important one in the world.
The 'Transatlantic Declaration' (TD) of 1990 was the first official agreement in the new era of transatlantic relations after the Cold War. It was largely a statement of shared values, emphasizing that the US and the EU are 'mindful of their common heritage and of their close historical, political, economic and cultural ties' and 'recogniz[e] that the transatlantic solidarity has been essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the development of free and prosperous economies as well as for the recent developments which have restored unity in Europe'. 6 The TD also laid the foundation for the institutionalization of the transatlantic partnership. It created intergovernmental institutions by establishing:
• bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on the one side, the President of the European Council and President of the EU Commission, and on the other side, the President of the United States; • bi-annual consultations between the European Union Foreign Ministers, with the talks often unsuccessful or deadlocked, the transatlantic relationship has the potential to set the rules for international economic activities using the two blocs' combined powers as biggest producers and consumers of goods and services in the world. Therefore the way this bilateral economic relationship is constructed is of crucial importance. 'When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the cohesive force of the common enemy subsided' field was also much more conflictladen than the shared security interests during the Cold War. The new framework not only brought down economic barriers but also highlighted differences in regulatory regimes and political preferences.
From Security to
The year 1995 brought a major evolution of TER and the institutionalization of the bilateral partnership with the agreement of the 'New Transatlantic Agenda' (NTA). By signing the NTA, US President Bill Clinton, EU Commission President Jacques Santer and EU Council President Felipe Gonzáles committed to organized cooperation in four key strategic areas:
• Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world • Responding to global challenges • Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations • Building bridges across the Atlantic. 11
In order to address these priority areas effectively, a series of institutional innovations were created in the wake of the NTA. As Mark Pollack commented, the 'establishment of a new and novel institutional architecture linking Washington and Brussels across a wide range of issue-areas, represent[ed] the most systematic effort at genuine bilateral governance in the history of the transatlantic partnership.' 12 The NTA complemented the intergovernmental institutionalization of the TD with transgovernmental and transnational institutions by creating a variety of civil society dialogues to strengthen The beginning of a formal institutionalization of the relationship was also necessary as the shift in transatlantic relations from security to economic issues was not without problems. As Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley observed in 1998: 'Economic globalization in the aftermath of the cold war may be causing tariffs, capital controls, and transport costs to decline, but it is also putting firms in the United States and Europe into closer competition.' 9 He concluded that 'policies on one side of the Atlantic -be they central bank decisions over the interest rate, congressional and parliamentary decisions about the budget, or government decisions about competition and regulatory policy -are having strong repercussions on the other. The scope for conflict in such an environment is considerable.' 10 The shift from security to economic cooperation thus made the transatlantic partnership more complicated. Not only did the basic rationale of the partnership shift to a new policy field, but the new commitments. Its main aim is to enhance the level of discourse between members of the European Parliament and the US Congress. 15
Structural Dysfunctionality: The Political Context
Institutional structures are important, but it is the political agenda which is vital for successful transatlantic relations. And in terms of mission, the main purpose of TER has been a narrow focus on trade liberalization and de-regulation: to bring down tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.
This limited political agenda had severe consequences for the transnational level of the transatlantic institutional structure. The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) folded after just a few meetings because there was simply nothing to gain or achieve for the labor movement in the framework of a purely free-market political agenda. 16 The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) suffered a similar fate. Even the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the NTA dialogue with the arguably biggest interest overlap with the agenda, nearly 'ran aground' when it seemed increasingly difficult to deliver progress in the business community's interest. 17 Most of the progress in the 1990s was made in the area of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). But as Mark Pollack and Gregory C. Schaffer made clear: 'In the view of many participants, the "low-hanging fruit" for economic cooperation had been picked. Governments on both sides now found it dif-bridge-building across the Atlantic and more structured networks of lower-level officials. After the NTA, the three level structure of transatlantic governance looked as follows: 13 Intergovernmental Level: On the political level, the FATEI represented an important shift of rationale, stressing the potential external effects of the transatlantic partnership. It stated that deeper transatlantic economic integration 'will encourage other countries to adopt the transatlantic economic model of respect for property rights, openness to investment, transparency and predictability in regulation, and the value of free markets'. 20 This new awareness of the potential external impact of the transatlantic economic partnership can be interpreted as somewhat defensive in view of rising economic competition, especially from China. As a report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) made clear: 'Given quite similar interests in bolstering the multilateral trading system, many analysts say that both sides could cooperate more in addressing the rising challenge posed by China.' 21 The Congressional researchers made a fundamentally important point: in view of rising economic challenges, the economic interests (especially external ones) of the EU and US are seemingly converging. Although the internal problems in the partnership remain, the changing external framework might well drive transatlantic economic cooperation forward.
The continuing institutionalization of the partnership is a further driver for closer integration. In this area, the FATEI created the most ficult to move beyond symbolic agreements and rearguard efforts at conflict resolution. Enhanced cooperation among regulators had not prevented new and bitter trade disputes from arising.' 18 The very limited effectiveness of transatlantic economic cooperation led to the EU Commission's 2004 report Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States. The report highlighted further agenda-setting problems, criticizing the tendency of TER to become overloaded with too many issues in very specific economic sectors and as a result failing in prioritizing issues of strategic importance. The lack of political ownership was another problem that was detected by the Commission. Without renewed political commitment at the highest level, the authors of the report feared that crucial strategic agenda-setting would be impossible. 19 Some of the report's recommendations were 'Although the internal problems in the partnership remain, the changing external framework might well drive transatlantic economic cooperation forward' substantial problems associated with this process, above all the dysfunctionality of the political agenda and the institutional structure as well as the lack of political ownership. These problems remain unresolved. What is needed is a widening of the institutional structure together with a broadening of the political agenda to create the general ownership TER need in order to be successful. The TEC needs to address more than tariff and nontariff trade barriers. The economics of trade and the social dimension of trade cannot be delinked. With the new administration in Washington and the new European Commission in place there is a window of opportunity to reshape TER and start working on solving its problems by including a wider spectrum of interests and stakeholders. First signs from the Obama administration have been hopeful. In early 2009, senior officials from the US and the EU started work on a plan to reframe and rethink the TEC.
If it is to develop effectively and coherently over the coming decade, TER needs a social dimension with a special focus on labor issues to overcome its problems. The narrow transatlantic political agenda of economic liberalization and regulation adjustment towards the goal of harmonizing standards and increasing competitiveness has been part of the wider process of economic globalization. And given the financial meltdown and subsequent recession, it is important that outdated ideological assumptions are avoided. The reality of economic relations is more complicated than just free trade. More coherent (and high profile transatlantic institution to date: the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), representing new political ownership at the highest level. Permanent TEC members are currently the European Commissioners for External Relations, Trade as well as Internal Market and Services. The US side is represented by the US Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce as well as the US Trade Representative. 22 The TEC focuses on regulatory cooperation in addition to deeper integration in the areas of intellectual property rights, trade, financial markets, innovation and technology as well as investment. 23 Accepting that 'the low-hanging fruits have been picked', deeper regulatory cooperation has the potential to lift the transatlantic economic partnership onto a qualitatively new level. Similar to what was called for in the 2004 Commission report, a 'High Level EU-US Regulatory Cooperation Forum' was established to 'facilitate early warning about diverging regulatory approaches'. 24 Policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic are also looking into how their impact assessment mechanisms can be used to identify potential regulatory conflicts at an early stage. 25 
The Challenge of a Social Dimension
This report has so far analyzed the economic, historic and political significance of TER and set out its potential to become a kind of blueprint for bilateral economic relations in a world that is more and more characterized by multipolarity. It has, however, also highlighted the Here are some examples suggesting why the TEC should add a social dimension to its work, with a special focus on labor issues:
• In December 2005, management at a Robert Bosch factory in New Richmond, Minnesota told workers who had exercised the right to strike that they would be permanently replaced unless they immediately ended the strike and returned to work. Fearful of losing their jobs, the workers surrendered. 26 higher) common standards will help businesses to prosper and employees to enjoy decent work conditions. Issues of industrial relations and quality of work deserve recognition on the transatlantic level.
In the following sections of this report some of the labor issues in transatlantic relations are outlined and a series of policy proposals developed that could form the core of a social dimension for TER. These policy proposals are meant to inform the rethinking process and present solutions to some of the problems that hitherto have prevented transatlantic economic cooperation from developing its full potential.
A Reality Check: On-the-Ground Stories from the Transatlantic Field
Conventional wisdom has it that the US and the member states of the EU have high wages, extensive social protection systems, good labor laws, and well-functioning legal systems to enforce them. Under this view, the transatlantic economic relationship starts with a strong social dimension as a default feature.
Such complacency is not warranted by reality. There are severe flaws in many areas of labor law and labor standards enforcement in the transatlantic context. Moreover, failing to act on a social dimension in transatlantic trade means that no signal is sent to the rest of the world on its importance in the global trade system. If the EU and the US fail to build a social dimension into their economic relationship, why should other countries or regions do so?
pressure on workers and trade unions to lower labor costs and collective bargaining protections. 32 In light of the crisis of global warming and the need for 'green jobs' growth, governments and multinational companies in the US and Europe should collaborate to jointly address the problem. They should not be allowed to compete by failing to take steps against global warming to gain short-term competitive advantage but moreover be encouraged and helped to be world leaders in the fight against climate change.
Coordinate trade and investment policies towards third countries and markets
The WTO's 'enabling clause' allows differential treatment of developing countries to enhance their prospects for economic growth and development through trade with the US and the EU. 
Building on Existing Social Commitments
In multiple instruments and forums, the US and the EU have already adopted principles reflecting a strong social dimension. Explicitly building them into the transatlantic economic relationship does not require new commitments or big new institutions. It does, however, call for an explicit restatement of such commitments and the creation of a small, focused institutional mechanism to ensure that commitments are met. The US and EU member states:
• are committed under ILO Conventions 87 and 98 to protect freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to collective bargaining; 34 
Conclusion
This report has outlined the strategic importance of the transatlantic economic partnership, sought to explain its deficiencies and made a series of recommendations for how to include and operationalize a social dimension in TER. Regardless of the ongoing rethinking process, the transatlantic political agenda is still narrowly focused on deregulation matters. 35 For the reasons given above the continued concentration on such issues alone is unlikely to create the necessary political ownership to make transatlantic economic cooperation more effective and live up to its potential and responsibility.
In the absence of capable global governance structures -the failure of the Copenhagen Summit on climate change again underlined these problems -interregionalism has an important governance role to play in an increasingly multipolar world. The transatlantic relationship is the most advanced interregional connection and therefore an important role model. It must not be allowed to fail. The thematic and institutional widening of the relationship -above all by including social issues -is the key to prevent this from happening.
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